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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 James R. Adams is a resident and member of the State 
Bar of Delaware.  For some time, he has expressed a desire to 
be considered for a judicial position in that state.  Following 
the announcement of several judicial vacancies, Adams 
considered applying but ultimately chose not to because the 
announcement required that the candidate be a Republican.  
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Because Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat, he 
concluded that any application he submitted would be futile. 
 
 Adams brings this suit against the Governor of the State 
of Delaware to challenge the provision of the Delaware 
Constitution that effectively limits service on state courts to 
members of the Democratic and Republican parties.  Adams 
claims that under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Elrod v. 
Burns1 and Branti v. Finkel,2 a provision that limits a judicial 
candidate’s freedom to associate (or not to associate) with the 
political party of his or her choice is unconstitutional.  The 
Governor argues that because judges are policymakers, there 
are no constitutional restraints on his hiring decisions and he 
should be free to choose candidates based on whether they 
belong to one of the two major political parties in Delaware—
that is, whether they are Democrats or Republicans.  We 
disagree and conclude that judges are not policymakers 
because whatever decisions judges make in any given case 
relates to the case under review and not to partisan political 
interests.  We therefore conclude that the portions of 
Delaware’s constitution that limit Adams’s ability to apply for 
a judicial position while associating with the political party of 
his choice violate his First Amendment rights, and we will 
accordingly affirm in part and reverse in part the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Adams. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
1 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
2 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
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 Background 
 
A. Article IV, Section 3 of the Delaware 
Constitution 
 
In 1897, Delaware was unique in its method of judicial 
selection—it was the only state in the country in which the 
governor appointed judges without legislative involvement.3  
Judicial selection became an important and contentious topic 
during Delaware’s constitutional convention that year.  
Debating whether or not to move to a system of judicial 
election, delegates to the convention expressed their deep 
concern over the politicization of the judiciary.  John Biggs, 
Sr., the president of the convention, explained his position that 
the appointment of judges would enable judges to remain free 
from political cronyism and partisanship: 
 
I think it would be very unwise that 
our Judges should be mixed up, I 
will say, in politics.  We can obtain 
good men in this way, by the 
confirmation by the Senate, 
without those men being under 
political obligations, such as are 
engendered at primaries and at 
general elections.  
 
And there are reasons, it occurs to 
me, why the Judges should not be 
elected that perhaps do not apply to 
                                              
3 Randy J. Holland, The Delaware State Constitution: A 
Reference Guide 128 (2002). 
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any other officers.  For after all, 
Judges are but human.  Whoever 
sits upon the Bench to pass upon 
the rights of yours as to your 
liberty and your property ought 
certainly to be as free from all 
influence and bias, political and 
otherwise, as it is possible to throw 
around that man.4 
 
The delegates ultimately recommended amending the 
Delaware Constitution to provide for gubernatorial nomination 
of judges, with confirmation by the Senate.  They did not stop 
there, however, and debated a novel approach designed to 
make the judiciary “non-partisan, or if it be a better word, bi-
partisan”—a limitation on the number of judges from one party 
that could sit on the bench at any given time.5 
 
  Some delegates voiced their support for the provision, 
stating that minority representation on the judicial bench would 
“bring about a fuller and freer discussion of these matters that 
come before them and that they may make fair and impartial 
decisions on those questions.”6  Some, however, expressed 
concern that the provision would bring about the opposite 
result.  As delegate Andrew Johnson explained: 
 
It is well known that [judges 
serving on Delaware’s] Judiciary 
at the present time have been 
                                              
4 J.A. 117–18. 
5 J.A. 130.   
6 J.A. 133.   
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appointed from one political party.  
That probably is not the best 
course to pursue, and I would be 
very glad to see the Governor of 
this State appoint well equipped 
men from another party.  I would 
hail the day when it was done and 
would be glad to have it; but to 
vote to compel a Governor to 
appoint a man on account of his 
political affiliation, you are simply 
saying, “You are put upon the 
Bench to look out for our party 
interests whenever they come up.”  
There is no other construction that 
you can put upon it.  There can be 
no other, in my own mind, 
established, and that man is 
expected, whenever a political 
question arises, before that Court 
to take care of his own party rights 
or privileges.7 
 
Ultimately, the provision prevailed, and Delaware’s 
constitution has included some form of a political balance 
requirement ever since.  In 1951, as part of a wider series of 
structural changes to the Delaware judiciary, the provision was 
modified to exclude third party and unaffiliated voters from 
applying to serve as judges on the Supreme Court, Superior 
Court, and Chancery Court in Delaware.  The system thus 
created is binary, excluding all candidates from consideration 
                                              
7 J.A. 134. 
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except those of the Republican or Democratic parties.  The 
provision has been reaffirmed during the amendment process 
several times, including in 2005.  Article IV, Section 3 of the 
Delaware Constitution now reads in relevant part: 
 
Appointments to the office of the 
State Judiciary shall at all times be 
subject to all of the following 
limitations: 
 
First, three of the five Justices of 
the Supreme Court in office at the 
same time, shall be of one major 
political party, and two of said 
Justices shall be of the other major 
political party. 
 
Second, at any time when the total 
number of Judges of the Superior 
Court shall be an even number not 
more than one-half of the members 
of all such offices shall be of the 
same political party; and at any 
time when the number of such 
offices shall be an odd number, 
then not more than a bare majority 
of the members of all such offices 
shall be of the same major political 
party, the remaining members of 
such offices shall be of the other 
major political party. 
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Third, at any time when the total 
number of the offices of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, the 
Judges of the Superior Court, the 
Chancellor and all the Vice-
Chancellors shall be an even 
number, not more than one-half of 
the members of all such offices 
shall be of the same major political 
party; and at any time when the 
total number of such offices shall 
be an odd number, then not more 
than a bare majority of the 
members of all such offices shall 
be of the same major political 
party; the remaining members of 
the Courts above enumerated shall 
be of the other major political 
party. 
 
Fourth, at any time when the total 
number of Judges of the Family 
Court shall be an even number, not 
more than one-half of the Judges 
shall be of the same political party; 
and at any time when the total 
number of Judges shall be an odd 
number, then not more than a 
majority of one Judge shall be of 
the same political party.  
 
Fifth, at any time when the total 
number of Judges of the Court of 
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Common Pleas shall be an even 
number, not more than one-half of 
the Judges shall be of the same 
political party; and at any time 
when the total number of Judges 
shall be an odd number, then not 
more than a majority of one Judge 
shall be of the same political 
party.8 
 
 Thus, the provision is made up of five sections—one 
addressing the Supreme Court, one addressing the Superior 
Court, one addressing combined membership of those courts 
and the Chancery Court, one addressing the Family Court, and, 
finally, one addressing the Court of Common Pleas.  
Significantly, there are also two separate, but connected, 
substantive components: the bare majority component (which 
limits the number of judicial positions that can be occupied by 
members of a single political party)9 and the major political 
party component (which mandates that the other judicial 
positions must be filled with members of the other major 
political party in Delaware).  In practice, then, most courts 
must be filled with Democrats and Republicans exclusively. 
 
 
                                              
8 Del. Const. art. IV, § 3. 
9 When there are an even number of judges on a given court, 
no more than half of the judicial seats may be held by members 
of a single political party.  When there is an odd number of 
judicial positions, no more than a bare majority (that is, one 
seat above half) may be held by members of a party.  Id.  
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B. Judicial Nominations in Delaware 
 
Since 1978, Delaware governors have relied on judicial 
nominating commissions to identify qualified candidates for 
judicial appointments.10  Eleven of the twelve commission 
members are appointment by the Governor, and the twelfth is 
appointed by the president of the Delaware State Bar 
Association with the consent of the Governor.11  The 
commission provides a list of three recommended candidates 
to the Governor.  The Governor is not free to ignore the 
commission’s recommendations; if he is not satisfied with the 
list, the commission generates another list of candidates.12  The 
nominating commission is politically balanced and comprised 
of both lawyers and non-lawyers.13  
  
When a judicial position becomes available, the 
nominating commission gives public notice of the positions 
available, the salary, and the job requirements, including the 
party membership required for nomination.  For example, in 
August 2012, the commission gave notice of five open judicial 
positions, of which three were open only to candidates who 
were members of the Democratic Party and two were open to 
members of either political party. 
 
 
                                              
10 Holland, supra note 3, at 129. 
11 See Executive Order 16, available at: 
https://governor.delaware.gov/executive-orders/ eo16/.   
12 Holland, supra note 3, at 129. 
13 Id. 
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C. James Adams’s Search for a Judicial 
Position 
 
James Adams, a member of the Delaware State Bar, is 
an Independent who desires a judicial position but has not 
applied for one due to his current political affiliation.   
 
Throughout his career, Adams was a registered 
Democrat and participated with the Democratic Party.  In early 
2017, that changed, as Adams became an Independent voter for 
the first time.14  Adams explained that he changed his 
affiliation because he is progressive and grew frustrated with 
the centrism of the Democratic Party in Delaware.  He now 
describes himself as “more of a [Vermont Senator] Bernie 
[Sanders] independent.”15   
 
Around the same time, Adams read an essay 
questioning the constitutionality of Article IV, Section 3. The 
essay focused in large part on the portion of the provision that 
requires judicial applicants to be members of one of 
Delaware’s two major political parties, and posed the question:  
“May Delaware enforce a state law providing that no 
Independent or member of a minor party shall be appointed to 
a judgeship?”16  After reading the article, Adams decided to 
                                              
14 Adams’s new voter registration card, indicating that he is 
unaffiliated with a political party, is dated February 13, 2017 
and was mailed to him on February 14, 2017.  Adams cannot 
remember the exact day that he switched his party affiliation.   
15 J.A. 74. 
16 See Joel Edan Friedlander, Is Delaware’s ‘Other Major 
Political Party’ Really Entitled to Half of Delaware’s 
Judiciary?, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 1139, 1154 (2016). 
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challenge the provision.  He filed the instant lawsuit against 
John Carney, the Governor of the State of Delaware, in 
February 2017.  At the time he filed the lawsuit, he pointed to 
two judicial vacancies that both required Republican 
candidates.  
 
Although Adams did not apply for either of those 
judicial positions, he has applied to similar positions in the 
past.  In 2009, Adams applied to be a Family Court 
Commissioner, but was not selected. In 2014, Adams 
considered applying for judicial positions on the Supreme 
Court and the Superior Court; however, at the time he was 
registered as a Democrat and the positions were open only to 
Republican candidates.  Shortly thereafter, in 2015, Adams 
retired and assumed emeritus status with the Delaware State 
Bar.  By 2017 he felt ready to resume searching for a judicial 
position, and believed he was a qualified applicant.  He 
therefore returned to active status in 2017.  Notwithstanding 
his interest, Adams has refrained from submitting an 
application based on his belief that he would not be considered 
for a judicial position because of Article IV, Section 3 and his 
new affiliation as an Independent voter. 
 
D. The District Court Proceedings17 
 
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
The Governor argued primarily that Adams lacks both Article 
III and prudential standing to bring his claims, and Adams 
argued that the political balance requirement violates the First 
                                              
17 Both parties consented to the entry of final judgment by a 
Magistrate Judge.  See Adams v. Hon. John Carney, Dkt. 2, No. 
17 Civ. 181 (MPT) (D. Del. 2017). 
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Amendment because it conditions appointment on a judicial 
candidate’s political affiliation. 
 
The District Court determined that Adams had Article 
III standing to challenge some, but not all, of the sections of 
the provision.  Chief Magistrate Judge Thynge considered the 
first three sections because they contain both a bare majority 
component and a major political party component.  She 
concluded that although Adams did not apply for an open 
judicial position on one of those courts, his application would 
have been futile because the openings available around the 
time he filed his complaint were not available to Independents 
like himself.  
 
Sections four and five, however, contain only the bare 
majority component, and Magistrate Judge Thynge concluded 
that Adams did not have standing to challenge those sections 
because his status as an Independent would not have prevented 
his application from being considered.  She nevertheless 
concluded that he had prudential standing to challenge those 
sections and found that sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
 
Turning to the merits, Magistrate Judge Thynge 
determined that Article IV, Section 3 restricted access to a 
government position (here, a judgeship) based on political 
affiliation.  She found that the narrow policymaking exception 
laid out in Elrod and Branti, which allows a government 
employer to make employment decisions based on political 
allegiance for policymakers, did not apply.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the District Court drew on Third Circuit and 
Supreme Court cases emphasizing that a judge’s job is to 
apply, rather than create, the law.  The District Court also cited 
the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct, which 
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mandates that judges refrain from political activity and 
instructs judges not to be swayed by personal opinion.  Because 
political affiliation could not be seen as a necessary trait for 
effective judicial decisionmaking, and because the District 
Court concluded that judges do not meet the policymaking 
exception established in Elrod and Branti, she found the 
provision unconstitutional in its entirety.  This appeal 
followed.18 
 
 Discussion 
 
A.       Standing 
 
1. Article III Standing 
 
We begin by addressing Adams’s constitutional 
standing.  Constitutional standing, also referred to as Article III 
standing, is “a threshold issue that must be addressed before 
considering issues of prudential standing.”19  Because it is an 
essential component of subject matter jurisdiction, if Article III 
                                              
18 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002). 
19 Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 269 
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Miller v. Nissan Motor Acceptance 
Corp., 362 F.3d 209, 221 n.16 (3d Cir. 2004)).   
15 
 
standing is lacking, our inquiry must end and Adams’s claim 
must be dismissed.20   
 
To satisfy the “irreducible conditional minimum” of 
standing, a plaintiff must show that he has: “(1) suffered an 
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable judicial decision.”21  Of standing’s three 
elements, “injury in fact, [is] the ‘first and foremost.’”22  “To 
establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she 
suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.’”23  However, a plaintiff need not 
make futile gestures to establish that injury is actual and not 
conjectural.24  
 
It is black letter that standing may not be “dispensed in 
gross.”25  Our cases demonstrate that we must ask not only 
whether Adams has standing to sue at all, but whether he has 
                                              
20 See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). 
21 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).   
22 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 
U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).  
23 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 
24 Sammon v. New Jersey Bd. of Medical Examiners, 66 F.3d 
639, 643 (3d Cir. 1995). 
25 Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 
1650 (2017) (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 
724, 734 (2008)). 
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standing to challenge part or all of Article IV, Section 3.26  
Accordingly, we do not ask only whether Adams has been 
injured by Article IV, Section 3 of the Delaware Constitution.  
We must identify how, if at all, he has been injured, and 
whether that injury stems from all or part of the provision. 
 
Adams desires a judgeship, and he has applied for, or 
considered applying for, judicial positions since at least 2009.  
If he felt his application would be reviewed, he would consider 
applying for a judicial seat on any of Delaware’s five 
constitutional courts.  But because Adams is an Independent, 
he has refrained from submitting an application in light of the 
restrictions of Article IV, Section 3. 
 
The District Court agreed with Adams that it would 
have been futile to apply for a judicial position on the Supreme 
Court, Superior Court, or Chancery Court, because under 
Delaware’s constitution, judges on those courts must be 
members of one of Delaware’s two major political parties, and 
Adams is not.  The Governor does not contest that Adams has 
constitutional standing to challenge these provisions, and we 
agree that Adams has clearly been injured by the major 
                                              
26 See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 995 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Our standing 
inquiry has two parts: whether the Contractors have standing 
to challenge the Ordinance at all, and if so, whether they have 
standing to challenge all or just part of the Ordinance.”); see 
also Service Employee’s Int’l Union, Local 3 v. Municipality 
of Mt. Lebanon, 446 F.3d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 2006) (separately 
considering a union’s standing to challenge each section of an 
allegedly unconstitutional municipality ordinance).  
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political party component and therefore has standing to 
challenge it. 
 
But the District Court also concluded that Adams’s 
application to either the Family Court or the Court of Common 
Pleas “would not have been futile, because there is no party 
requirement constitutionally attached to either Court.”27  
Adams argues that the bare majority component injures him 
independently of the major political party component because 
it “limit[s] the right to a bare majority to members of a 
‘political party.’”28  In his view, the bare majority component 
mandates that one of the two major political parties control a 
bare majority of judicial seats on the relevant court, thereby 
limiting an Independent’s ability to successfully apply for a 
position.  The component, however, creates a ceiling for 
members of the same political party; it does not create a floor 
entitling them to a certain number of judicial seats.29  
  
Therefore, we agree with the District Court’s reading of 
Article IV, Section 3 and conclude that Adams does not have 
standing to challenge the sections of the provision that contain 
only the bare majority component.  Nevertheless, the District 
Court went on to conclude that Adams did not need to establish 
                                              
27 J.A. 13.  The last two sections of the provision, which cover 
the Family Court and the Court of Common Pleas, contain only 
the bare majority component. 
28 Appellee’s Br. at 13–14. 
29 As the District Court explained, the bare majority component 
“places no limitations on unaffiliated voters and only affects 
judicial candidates of a major political party when the bare 
majority of judicial offices on those courts is filled with 
individuals affiliated with that major political party.”  J.A. 29. 
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constitutional standing because he established prudential 
standing.  The District Court’s conclusion that prudential 
standing can serve as “substitute” standing for a plaintiff who 
cannot demonstrate constitutional standing is incorrect.  While 
Article III standing is a threshold issue that implicates subject 
matter jurisdiction, prudential standing is not.  Instead, it is a 
“judicially self-imposed limit[] on the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction.”30  Prudential standing cannot vest a court with 
subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, it cannot replace or 
substitute for constitutional standing, as without the latter, the 
case must be dismissed.31  Therefore, because Adams does not 
have Article III standing with respect to the Family Court and 
the Court of Common Pleas, we may not consider the merits of 
his argument with respect to those courts.32 
                                              
30 Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 821 F.3d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 757 
(2013)). 
31 See Lance, 549 U.S. at 439. 
32 The Governor argues that because Adams lacked standing to 
challenge the sections of Article IV, Section 3 that contain only 
the bare majority component, he also cannot challenge the bare 
majority component even where it appears in the sections of 
Article IV, Section 3 governing the makeup of the Supreme 
Court, Superior Court, and Chancery Court, where the bare 
majority requirement is tied to the major political party 
component.  The Governor’s argument confuses the standing 
doctrine with the severability doctrine.  When we consider 
standing, we ask whether the plaintiff before us has actually 
been injured by the statute or constitutional provision she 
challenges.  See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560–61).  When we consider severability, we ask 
whether all or only part of a constitutionally infirm statute must 
19 
 
 
2. Prudential Standing 
We next address whether the doctrine of prudential 
standing should give us pause before reaching the merits of the 
dispute over the first three sections of the political balance 
requirement.  Even when Article III standing is present, we 
look to prudential considerations “to avoid deciding questions 
of broad social import where no individual rights would be 
vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those 
                                              
be stricken.  See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006).  The Governor’s 
argument puts the cart before the horse by asking us to consider 
whether Adams would have standing to challenge the bare 
majority component if the major political party component 
were stricken from those sections.  But that is not what is 
before us, and we have never held that standing must be 
established independently for each clause of a challenged 
provision.  Once a plaintiff has met the Article III requirements 
for a particular constitutional or statutory provision, we have 
jurisdiction to turn to the merits of her case.  If we determine 
on the merits that part of the statute that has injured her is 
unconstitutional, we then ask whether part of the statute can 
remain intact while the unconstitutional part falls.  The 
Governor, recognizing as much, relies on our severability 
jurisprudence to argue that we should leave the bare majority 
provision intact without explicitly referencing the doctrine.  
Recognizing his argument for what it is, we will address the 
severability of the two components after addressing the 
constitutionality of Article IV, Section 3.   
20 
 
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.”33  Prudential 
standing requires “(1) that a litigant assert his or her own legal 
interests rather than those of a third party; (2) that the grievance 
not be so abstract as to amount to a generalized grievance; (3) 
and that the [plaintiff’s] interests are arguably within the ‘zone 
of interests’ protected by the statute, rule, or constitutional 
provision on which the claim is based.”34 
   
We see no reason to ignore Adams’s challenge to 
Article IV, Section 3 on prudential grounds.  Although the 
question is surely one of broad social import in Delaware, 
Adams has established that aside from his political affiliation, 
he feels qualified for a judicial position and intends to apply 
for a judicial position if he is able.  The provision may be of 
interest to many residents of Delaware, but Adams has shown 
that he has a particular legal interest in the constitutionality of 
Article IV, Section 3 because of his desire to apply for a 
judicial position while refraining from associating with either 
the Democratic or Republican parties.  
  
The Governor’s arguments to the contrary are 
unavailing.  He states that Adams’s interest in this case is 
“merely an academic exercise” because Adams switched his 
political affiliation in the days before filing this Complaint, and 
had not applied for a judicial position since 2009 although, as 
a registered Democrat until 2017, he could have.35  Essentially, 
the Governor’s argument asks us to discredit the portions of 
                                              
33 Joint Stock Society v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 179 
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker 
State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
34 Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 340 (3d Cir. 2012).   
35 Appellant’s Br. at 24–25. 
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Adams’s deposition in which he explained why he decided to 
leave the Democratic Party (he was frustrated by the lack of 
progressive Democrats in Delaware) and why he did not apply 
for a judicial position after 2009 (he found working for the late 
Beau Biden rewarding and therefore did not consider other 
career opportunities until after Biden’s death in 2015).  But in 
opposing a motion for summary judgment, the Governor was 
required to do more than speculate that Adams has deceived 
the Court about his genuine interest in applying for a judicial 
position.36  The short time period in which Adams changed his 
party affiliation, read the law review article, and filed suit, 
without more, is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact about Adams’s prudential standing. 
 
B. The Elrod/Branti Inquiry 
 
We now turn to the heart of this appeal:  whether the 
sections of Article IV, Section 3 of the Delaware Constitution 
that govern the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, and the 
Chancery Court run afoul of the First Amendment’s guarantee 
of freedom of association.  A trio of seminal United States 
Supreme Court cases explain the limits on a government 
employer’s ability to consider a job candidate’s political 
                                              
36 Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (a movant may not rely on “speculation and 
conjecture in opposing a motion for summary judgment”). 
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allegiance and govern our analysis here:  Elrod,37 Branti,38 and 
Rutan.39  We discuss each case in turn. 
 
In Elrod v. Burns, Justice Brennan, writing for the 
plurality, recognized that the practice of patronage 
dismissals—dismissing a civil servant because his political 
affiliation differed from the political party in power—is 
“inimical to the process which undergirds our system of 
government and is at war with the deeper traditions of 
democracy embodied in the First Amendment.”40  He 
explained that to justify terminating a public employee based 
on political allegiance, the government must show that the 
practice “further[s] some vital government end by a means that 
is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in 
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the 
loss of constitutionally protected rights.”41  The plurality 
suggested that the government’s interest in employee loyalty 
would allow it to discharge employees in policymaking 
positions based on political allegiance.42  Although “no clear 
line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking 
                                              
37 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
38 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
39 Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
40 427 U.S. at 357 (internal quotations marks omitted (quoting 
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 
(1972))).  In a concise concurrence, Justice Stewart, joined by 
Justice Blackmun, stated that a “nonpolicymaking, 
nonconfidential government employee” may not be discharged 
or threatened with discharge on the sole ground of his or her 
political beliefs.  Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
41 Id. at 363. 
42 Id. at 367. 
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positions,” the plurality instructed factfinders to consider the 
nature of the employee’s responsibilities to determine whether 
or not he or she is in a policymaking position.43 
  
The Court next examined the First Amendment 
implications of politically-motivated employment decisions in 
Branti v. Finkel.  Summarizing Elrod, the Court stated that “if 
an employee’s private political beliefs would interfere with the 
discharge of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may 
be required to yield to the State’s vital interest in maintaining 
governmental effectiveness and efficiency.”44  The Court, 
however, moved away from Elrod’s policymaking distinction 
and held that “the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 
‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, 
the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate 
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the public office involved.”45  The 
Court explained that some positions, like that of an election 
judge, might be political without being a policymaking role, 
and some, like that of a state university football coach, might 
involve setting policy without being political.46 
 
In Rutan, the Court confirmed that the general 
prohibition on politically-motivated discharge also applies to 
decisions to promote, transfer, or hire an employee.47  “Unless 
these patronage practices are narrowly tailored to further vital 
                                              
43 Id. at 367–68. 
44 Branti, 445 U.S. at 517. 
45 Id. at 518. 
46 Id.  
47 Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74. 
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government interests, we must conclude that they 
impermissibly encroach on First Amendment freedoms.”48 
 
The Governor of Delaware sets forth two arguments to 
justify his practice of requiring applicants for judicial positions 
to be Democrats or Republicans:  first, the Governor argues 
that because judges are policymakers, they can be hired or fired 
based on their political affiliation without restraint, and second, 
the Governor argues that even if they are not policymakers, 
Delaware has an interest in political balance that justifies the 
restrictions set forth in Article IV, Section 3. 
 
1. The Policymaking Exception49 
 
In our cases applying Branti, Elrod, and Rutan, we have 
set forth criteria to aid us in determining whether an 
employee’s job responsibilities would make political party 
allegiance an appropriate condition of employment.  We 
consider “whether the employee has duties that are non-
discretionary or non-technical, participates in discussions or 
                                              
48 Id. at 74. 
49 Adams argues that after Branti, the question of whether a 
government position involves policymaking is irrelevant.  We 
disagree.  As we have explained before, after Branti, “the fact 
that an employee is in a policymaking or confidential position 
is relevant to the question of whether political affiliation is a 
necessary job requirement but this fact is no longer dispositive 
. . . .”  Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168–69 (3d Cir. 1986); 
see also Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 
265, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The exception for ‘policymaking’ 
jobs exists because political loyalty is essential to the position 
itself.”).   
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other meetings, prepares budgets, possesses the authority to 
hire or fire other employees, has a high salary, retains power 
over others, and can speak in the name of policymakers.”50  
The “key factor” is whether an employee in that position “has 
meaningful input into decisionmaking concerning the nature 
and scope of a major program.”51   Using this analysis, we have 
concluded that political affiliation is an appropriate 
requirement for a director of a veterans’ administrative 
services department,52 an assistant director of public 
information,53 assistant district attorneys,54 city solicitors and 
assistant city solicitors,55 a solicitor for the Northeast 
Pennsylvania Hospital and Education Authority,56 and a city 
manager,57 among others.  We have never before considered 
the role of a state judge.  We now conclude that a judicial 
officer, whether appointed or elected, is not a policymaker.  
  
This outcome is clear from the principles animating 
Elrod and Branti.  The purpose of the policymaking exception 
is to ensure that elected officials may put in place loyal 
employees who will not undercut or obstruct the new 
                                              
50 Galli, 490 F.3d at 271 (citing Brown, 787 F.2d at 169). 
51 Id. (quoting Armour v. County of Beaver, PA, 271 F.3d 417, 
429 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
52 Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1298–1303 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
53 Brown, 787 F.2d at 169–70. 
54 Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9, 10 (3d Cir. 1982). 
55 Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 520–22 (3d Cir. 1981). 
56 Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 384–86 (3d Cir. 1998). 
57 Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
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administration.58  If a job “cannot properly be conditioned upon 
allegiance to the political party in control,” the policymaking 
exception is inappropriate.59  Judges simply do not fit this 
description.  The American Bar Association’s Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct instructs judges to promote “independence” 
and “impartiality,” not loyalty.60  It also asks judges to refrain 
from political or campaign activity.61  The Delaware Code of 
Judicial Conduct similarly makes clear that judges must be 
“unswayed by partisan interests” and avoid partisan political 
activity.62  The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that 
Delaware judges “must take the law as they find it, and their 
personal predilections as to what the law should be have no 
place in efforts to override properly stated legislative will.”63  
Independence, not political allegiance, is required of Delaware 
judges.  
  
                                              
58 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (“A second interest advanced in 
support of patronage is the need for political loyalty of 
employees, not to the end that effectiveness and efficiency be 
insured, but to the end that representative government not be 
undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies 
of the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by 
the electorate.  The justification is not without force, but is 
nevertheless inadequate to validate patronage wholesale.  
Limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is 
sufficient to achieve this governmental end.”). 
59 Branti, 445 U.S. at 519. 
60 Am. Bar Ass’n Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1. 
61 Id. Canon 4. 
62 Del. Judges’ Code Judicial Conduct Rules 2.4(A), 4.1. 
63 Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1292 (Del. 2007) 
(quoting Ewing v. Beck, 520 A. 2d 653, 660 (1987)). 
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Article IV, Section 3 itself illustrates that political 
loyalty is not an appropriate job requirement for Delaware 
judges.  Delaware has chosen to considerably limit the 
Governor’s ability to nominate judges on the basis of political 
expediency.  Instead, the Governor must ensure that there are 
sufficient Democratic and Republican judges on the bench.  
Far from nominating only judges who will be loyal to his party, 
the Governor may be required by Delaware’s constitution to 
nominate judges who belong to a different political party.  The 
Governor, therefore, cannot credibly argue that he must be free 
to follow a rule excluding those who do not belong to the two 
major parties in Delaware because allegiance to his party is an 
appropriate condition for judicial employment. 
   
Nor are we swayed by his argument that the important 
role judges play in Delaware transforms them into political 
actors.  The Governor argues that by interpreting statutes, 
sentencing criminal defendants, and crafting the common law, 
judges in Delaware make policy and exercise significant 
discretion.  But the question before us is not whether judges 
make policy,64 it is whether they make policies that necessarily 
reflect the political will and partisan goals of the party in 
                                              
64 Compare Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 515 (1976) 
(“Nor, in ratifying these statutory classifications, is our role to 
hypothesize independently . . . .  These matters of practical 
judgment and empirical calculation are for Congress.”), with 
Wetzel, 139 F.3d at 386 (“Tough legal questions are not 
answered mechanically, but rather by the exercise of seasoned 
judgment.  Judgment is informed by experience and 
perspective . . . .”); see generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 465–67 (1991) (explaining, without resolving, the debate 
over whether judges make policy).  
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power.  That is why, as the Court explained in Branti, a football 
coach for a state university cannot be discharged because of 
her political affiliation even though she may formulate policy 
for the athletic department.65  And why public defenders, who 
made some policy decisions in fulfilling their public office, 
still could not be fired on the basis of their political 
allegiance—because their policymaking activity did not relate 
to “any partisan political interest.”66 
  
To the extent that Delaware judges create policy, they 
do so by deciding individual cases and controversies before 
them, not by creating partisan agendas that reflect the interests 
of the parties to which they belong.67  Similarly, although the 
Governor contends that Delaware judges have meaningful 
input into a major government program because they set the 
judiciary’s budget and create rules of civil and criminal 
procedure, the operation of the judicial branch is not “so 
intimately related to [Delaware] policy” that the Governor 
would have “the right to receive the complete cooperation and 
loyalty of a trusted advisor [in that position].”68 
                                              
65 Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. 
66 Id. at 519. 
67 See Branti, 445 U.S. at 519–20 (“[W]hatever policymaking 
occurs in the public defender’s officer must relate to the needs 
of individual clients and not to any partisan political interests. 
. . .  Under these circumstances, it would undermine, rather than 
promote, the effective performance of an assistant public 
defender’s office to make his tenure dependent on his 
allegiance to the dominant political party.”). 
68 Ness, 660 F.2d at 522 (“[W]e agree with the district court 
that, as a matter of law, the duties imposed on city solicitors by 
the York Administrative Code and the undisputed functions 
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The policymaking inquiry is designed to test whether 
the position in question “is one which cannot be performed 
effectively except by someone who shares the political beliefs 
of [the appointing authority].”69  Put simply, while judges 
clearly play a significant role in Delaware, that does not make 
the judicial position a political role tied to the will of the 
Governor and his political preferences.  As such, the 
policymaking exception does not apply to members of the 
judicial branch. 
 
We are aware that two of our sister Circuits have 
concluded otherwise.  In Kurowski v. Krajewski, the Seventh 
Circuit determined that the guiding question in political 
affiliation cases was “whether there may be genuine debate 
about how best to carry out the duties of the office in question, 
and a corresponding need for an employee committed to the 
objectives of the reigning faction,” and answered that question 
in the affirmative with respect to judges and judges pro 
                                              
entailed by these duties e.g., rendering legal opinions, drafting 
ordinances, [and] negotiating contracts define a position for 
which party affiliation is an appropriate requirement.  In 
relying on an attorney to perform these functions so intimately 
related to city policy, the mayor has the right to receive the 
complete cooperation and loyalty of a trusted adviser, and 
should not be expected to settle for less.”). 
69 Brown, 787 F.2d at 170.  See also Branti, 445 U.S. at 517 
(“[I]f an employee’s private political beliefs would interfere 
with the discharge of his public duties, his First Amendment 
rights may be required to yield to the State’s vital interest in 
maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency.”). 
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tempore.70  In Newman v. Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit similarly 
concluded that judges were policymakers who could be 
appointed on the basis of their partisan affiliation.71  We find 
these cases unpersuasive for two reasons. 
 
First, we do not believe, as the Seventh Circuit does, 
that the policymaking exception described in Elrod and Branti 
is merely “shorthand for a broad category of public employees 
whose work is politically sensitive and who exercise 
significant discretion in the performance of their duties.”72  
Under the Seventh Circuit’s view, so long as employees make 
decisions involving issues about which “political debates 
rage,” they may be hired or fired for their party affiliation.73  
                                              
70 Kurowksi, 848 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A judge both 
makes and implements governmental policy.  A judge may be 
suspicious of the police or sympathetic to them, stern or lenient 
in sentencing, and political debates rage about such questions.  
In most states judges are elected, implying that the office has a 
political component.  Holders of the appointing authority may 
seek to ensure that judges agree with them on important 
jurisprudential questions.”). 
71 Newman, 986 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1993) (“We agree with 
the holding in Kurowski that judges are policymakers because 
their political beliefs influence and dictate their decisions on 
important jurisprudential matters. . . .  Therefore, we believe 
that Governor Voinovich’s appointment of judges based on 
political considerations is consistent with Elrod, Branti, and 
Rutan.”). 
72 Hagan v. Quinn, 867 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding 
that arbitrators on the Illinois Workers’ Compensation 
Commission are policymakers).  
73 Kurowski, 848 F.2d at 770. 
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We have always more narrowly applied the policymaking 
exception to only the class of employees whose jobs “cannot 
be performed effectively except by someone who shares the 
political beliefs of [the appointing authority].”74  There can be 
no serious question that judicial candidates of different 
political parties can effectively serve as state judges.  Thus, 
while “political debates rage” about issues that judges must 
decide in the course of their state employment, we do not 
believe that this leaves judges entirely at the whim of state 
governors and the patronage of the ruling party.  While states 
have nearly unfettered discretion to select state judges, states 
cannot condition judicial positions on partisan political 
affiliation alone. 
 
Second, the opinions in Kurowski and Newman conflate 
an appointing authority’s ability to consider the political 
beliefs and ideologies of state employees with that authority’s 
ability to condition employment on party loyalty. Under our 
case law, discrimination based on political patronage is only 
actionable where the employee’s political affiliation was a 
“substantial or motivating factor in the government’s 
employment decision.”75  Elrod and Branti protect 
affiliation—and decisions not to affiliate—with a political 
party.  We have never read them to prohibit an appointing 
official from considering a job candidate’s views on questions 
and issues related to the job itself.  There is a wide gulf between 
a governor asking a judicial candidate about his philosophy on 
sentencing, for example, and a governor posting a sign that 
                                              
74 Brown, 787 F.2d at 170. 
75 Galli, 490 F.3d at 271. 
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says “Communists need not apply.”76  The former does not run 
afoul of the First Amendment; but in our view, the latter does.  
Because the approach of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits would 
allow governors both to weigh an individual candidate’s 
political beliefs and to condition judicial positions on party 
allegiance, we must disagree. 
 
We therefore conclude that state judges do not fall 
within the policymaking exception because affiliation with a 
particular political party is not a requirement for the effective 
performance of the judicial role. 
 
2. Delaware’s Interest in Political Balance 
 
We next consider the Governor’s second argument, 
that even if state judges are not policymakers, their political 
affiliation is still an appropriate condition of state employment.  
The Court in Rutan emphasized that politically motivated 
employment practices could be constitutional if they are 
“narrowly tailored to further vital government interests.”77  
While most cases following Branti have focused on the 
policymaking exception, which relates to a state’s interest in 
the loyalty and efficiency of key state employees, the Governor 
argues that Article IV, Section 3 can be justified by a different 
interest—the interest in political balance.  We need not dwell 
long on whether Delaware possesses a “vital state interest” in 
a politically balanced judiciary, because Delaware’s practice of 
excluding Independents and third party voters from judicial 
employment is not narrowly tailored to that interest. 
                                              
76 See Keyishian v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 
U.S. 589, 605–10 (1967). 
77 Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74. 
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The Governor posits that the Supreme Court has 
always recognized the permissibility of conditioning 
appointments on political affiliation when the goal is to ensure 
political balance.  In Branti, the Court stated that “if a State’s 
election laws require that precincts be supervised by two 
election judges of different parties, a Republican judge could 
be legitimately discharged solely for changing his party 
registration.”78  Similarly, in LoFrisco v. Schaffer and 
Hechinger v. Martin, the Supreme Court affirmed two district 
court decisions approving political balance statutes governing 
elections for a state’s boards of education and the District of 
Columbia’s city council, respectively.79  The Governor also 
points to several federal administrative agencies that use some 
form of political balance requirement for decisionmaking 
bodies, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the 
Commission on Civil Rights, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, and the Federal Election Commission.  These 
examples show some support for the Governor’s argument, but 
                                              
78 Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.  The Sixth Circuit, following Branti, 
has categorically held that employment decisions conditioned 
on political party affiliation are permissible where the position 
is one of several “filled by balancing out political party 
representation, or that are filled by balancing out selections 
made by different government agents or bodies.”  McCloud v. 
Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996).   
79 See LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743, 744–45, 750 (D. 
Conn. 1972), aff’d 409 U.S. 972 (1972); Hechinger v. Martin, 
411 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D.D.C. 1976), aff’d 429 U.S. 1030 
(1977). 
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unlike elected officials and agency representatives who 
explicitly make policy, judges perform purely judicial 
functions.  Further, it is difficult to see how the logic of 
political balance and minority representation extends from 
multimember deliberative bodies, like a school board, to 
Delaware’s judiciary, most of whom sit alone.80 
 
The Seventh Circuit has also addressed the political 
balance interest in the judicial context.  In Common Cause 
Indiana v. Individual Members of the Indiana Election 
Commission, the court considered a municipal ordinance 
prohibiting political parties from nominating candidates for 
more than half of the eligible seats on its superior court.81  The 
Seventh Circuit found that partisan balance concerns are less 
compelling with respect to judges, who are “not elected [or 
appointed] to represent a particular viewpoint” and instead are 
required to “exercise [their] own independent authority to 
make decisions that uphold and apply the law fairly and 
impartially.”82  The court also emphasized that “partisan 
balance amongst the judges who comprise the court, alone, has 
little bearing on impartiality” because while it can “serve as a 
                                              
80 The Delaware Supreme Court is the only judicial body in 
which a panel of judges regularly hears cases as a collective.  
Even then, panels are usually comprised of three of the five 
judges on the court.  The political balance on a panel, therefore, 
does not necessarily mirror the political balance of the 
Supreme Court as a whole.  See Randy J. Holland and David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without Controversy, 5 DEL. L. 
REV. 115, 121 (2002). 
81 Common Cause, 800 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2015).   
82 Id. at 922–23.   
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check against contrary partisan interests,” it does not affect 
“the impartiality of individual members.”83 
 
While we share many of the Seventh Circuit’s 
concerns about conflating party balance with judicial 
impartiality, we need not resolve the issue today.  To justify a 
rule that impinges an employee’s First Amendment association 
rights, the state must show both that the rule promotes “a vital 
state interest” and that the rule is “narrowly tailored” to that 
interest.  Even assuming judicial political balance is a vital 
Delaware interest, the Governor must also show that the goals 
of political balance could not be realized without the restrictive 
nature of Article IV, Section 3, and this he has failed to do. 
   
The Governor describes the benefits of balance and 
details the popularity Article IV, Section 3 has among 
Delaware judges and former judges.  But this cannot suffice as 
a justification to bar candidates who do not belong to either the 
Democratic or Republican parties from seeking judicial 
appointment, because the Governor fails to explain why this is 
the least restrictive means of achieving political balance.  
Because the Governor has not shown that Article IV, Section 3 
is narrowly tailored to further a vital state interest, the 
infringement on judicial candidates’ association rights is 
unconstitutional. 
 
C. Severability  
 
We need not determine whether the bare majority 
component, operating alone, would be unconstitutional, 
because we conclude that the unconstitutional major political 
                                              
83 Id.  
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party requirement is not severable from the sections of Article 
IV, Section 3 relating to the Supreme Court, Superior Court, 
and Chancery Court.  
 
Severability of a state statute or constitutional provision 
is a question of state law.84  The Chancery Court has explained 
that severability analysis under Delaware law proceeds in two 
steps:  first, courts consider whether the “unobjectionable” part 
of the provision, standing alone, would be capable of 
enforcement; and second, courts consider whether the 
legislature intended for the unobjectionable part to stand “in 
case the other part should fall.”85  In determining whether one 
portion of a statute or constitutional provision is severable from 
another, the “touchstone” must always be legislative intent.86 
 
Here, there is no question that the bare majority 
component is capable of standing alone, as it does in the 
provisions of Article IV, Section 3 involving the Family Court 
and the Court of Common Pleas.  But because we do not think 
the two components were intended to operate separately, we 
find that the major political party component is not severable.   
 
For nearly seventy years, the bare majority component 
and the major political party component have been intertwined 
in the sections of Article IV, Section 3 pertaining to the 
                                              
84 See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pennsylvania, 6 F.3d at 997 
(quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 
750, 772 (1988)). 
85 Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 88 A.3d 654, 669 n. 68 (Del. 
2014) (quoting Farmers of Fairness v. Kent Cty., 940 A.2d 
947, 962 (Del. Ch. 2008)). 
86 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330; see also Doe, 88 A.3d at 669 n. 68. 
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Supreme Court, Chancery Court, and Superior Court.  Both 
components operate in tandem to dictate the bi-partisan 
makeup of Delaware’s courts.  Operating alone, the bare 
majority component could be interpreted to allow a Governor 
to appoint a liberal member of the Green Party to a Supreme 
Court seat when there are already three liberal Democrats on 
that bench.  Only with the (unconstitutional) major political 
party component does the constitutional provision fulfil its 
purpose of preventing single party dominance while ensuring 
bipartisan representation.87   
   
Against this backdrop, the Governor has offered no 
evidence suggesting that the Delaware General Assembly, 
which authorizes constitutional amendments, intended for the 
bare majority component to stand even if the major political 
party component fell.  The Governor points to no applicable 
severability legislation passed by the General Assembly, nor 
has he shown that in the history of this specific constitutional 
provision, the General Assembly conceived of the components 
as independent and separable.88   
                                              
87 Cf. id. (finding that two provisions of a housing policy were 
not severable when they were “enacted[] together” and one 
provision was designed to “enforce compliance” with the 
other); Matter of Oberly, 524 A.2d 1176, 1182 (Del. 1987) 
(explaining that severance is only possible if the residual 
component has “separate purpose and independent legislative 
significance”).   
88 This case, then, is a far cry from cases like Ayotte and 
Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, upon which 
the Governor relies.  In both cases, the laws at issue contained 
severability clauses that are not present here.  See Ayotte, 546 
U.S. at 331; Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, 573 U.S. 25, 36 (2014); 
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While we are mindful that we should refrain from 
invalidating more of a statute than necessary,89 here, the two 
substantive components of Article IV, Section 3 are 
interdependent and equally integral to the political balance 
scheme Delaware envisioned for the Supreme Court, Superior 
Court, and Chancery Court.  It is not our place to rewrite the 
balance the General Assembly struck in crafting Article IV, 
Section 3 ourselves.90  Finding that the major political party 
component cannot be severed, we conclude that the sections of 
Article IV, Section 3 containing the major political party 
component are unconstitutional and must be stricken. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we find that Adams has 
shown that his freedom of association rights were violated by 
the political balance requirement that prevented his application 
                                              
see also State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761, 766 (Del. 1972), 
abrogated on other grounds by Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (finding statutory provisions severable 
because of Delaware’s general severability statute). 
89 Cf. Dickerson, 298 A.2d at 766 n. 11 (“Any doubt, as to the 
correctness of our conclusion on severability, is resolved by the 
maxims that a statute must be held valid if it is possible for the 
court to do so; that every presumption must be resolved in 
favor of its validity; and that it should not be declared 
unconstitutional unless the court is convinced of that status 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
90 See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (“[W]e restrain ourselves from 
rewriting state law . . . even as we strive to salvage it.” (internal 
punctuation marks and citation omitted)).   
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to the Supreme Court, Superior Court, and Chancery Court.  
Therefore, we conclude that the first three sections of Article 
IV, Section 3 violate the First Amendment.  We affirm the 
District of Delaware’s order granting summary judgment to 
Adams on those sections.  Because Adams had no standing to 
challenge the sections of Article IV, Section 3 dealing with the 
Family Court and the Court of Common Pleas, however, we 
reverse the District of Delaware’s order as it pertained to those 
sections. 
1 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring.  Judges Restrepo and 
Fuentes join. 
  
I join my colleagues’ thoughtful opinion in its entirety. 
I write separately merely to add the perspective of someone 
who has served as a state court judge in a jurisdiction that 
selects judges in general elections preceded by partisan 
political campaigning and the fundraising that is endemic to 
political campaigns. In doing so, I certainly do not mean to in 
anyway cast aspersions upon the many dedicated, intelligent 
and hardworking men and women whom the electorate in such 
jurisdictions ultimately select to serve as judges. I only wish to 
note the potential damage to the image of the judiciary in such 
jurisdictions and the extent to which it can undermine the 
public’s faith in the judges who are elected.1    
 
All of us have a keen understanding of, and appreciation 
for, the fact that the provisions we strike down today were 
enacted to ensure selection of a judiciary whose political 
balance would serve notice that judicial decisions were devoid 
of politics and political motivations. Paradoxically, by 
elevating one’s political affiliation to a condition precedent to 
eligibility for appointment to the bench by the Governor, 
Delaware has institutionalized the role of political affiliation 
                                              
1 The criticism of systems where judges are elected has stressed 
the importance of such irrelevant factors as campaign 
contributions and the importance of ballot position. See The 
Inquirer Editorial Board, Editorial, Close Down the Circus: 
Replace Judicial Elections with Merit Selection, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, (July 13, 2018) 
(http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/editorials/judicial-
election-merit-selection-pennsylvania-election-reform-
20180713.html) (“In Pennsylvania we elect judges in partisan 
elections . . . The corrosive effects of money work over time 
until it is impossible for people to trust the court system.”); 
Ryan Briggs, Does Ballot Position Matter? Science Says ‘Yes,’ 
CITY AND STATE PENNSYLVANIA (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.cityandstatepa.com/content/does-ballot-position-
matter-science-says-%E2%80%98yes%E2%80%99 (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2019) (“Sheer luck has more to do with 
becoming [a] judge in the city [of Philadelphia] than 
experience or endorsements.”). 
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rather than negated it. As we explain, the resulting system of 
judicial selection is in conflict with the First Amendment right 
of association even though it has historically produced an 
excellent judiciary; accordingly, it cannot survive this First 
Amendment challenge. Although this is as paradoxical as it is 
ironic, it is really not surprising that the judicial system that has 
resulted from Delaware’s political balance requirements is as 
exemplary as the judges who comprise it.  
 
In 2011, then-Delaware Supreme Court Justice Randy 
J. Holland presciently observed that the “political balance 
provisions appear to prevent the appointment of persons 
belonging to a third political party or having no party 
affiliation. To date, however, there has been no court challenge 
to this requirement under the United States Constitution.”2 
Justice Holland’s observation about the absence of challenges 
to the 122 year-old constitutional framework that plainly 
implicates the First Amendment is understandable given the 
well-earned excellent reputation of the state courts it has 
produced.  
  
Praise for the Delaware judiciary is nearly universal, 
and it is well deserved. Scholars and academics routinely refer 
to Delaware’s courts as the preeminent forum for litigation, 
particularly for cases involving business disputes.3 On the 
bicentennial anniversary of the establishment of the Court of 
Chancery, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the 
“Delaware state court system has established its national 
preeminence in the field of corporation law” and identified 
such hallmarks of the Court of Chancery as its “[j]udicial 
efficiency and expertise, a well-paid and well-respected 
judiciary, innovative judicial administration [and] courageous 
                                              
2 Randy J. Holland, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION 
149 (2011). 
3 See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 
41 J. OF CORP. L. 217, 224 (2016) (referring to the 
“preeminence of Delaware’s courts in resolving corporate 
disputes”); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1908, 
1926 (1998) (“Delaware courts have earned a unique 
reputation for quality adjudication”). 
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leadership.”4 Members of the Delaware bench credit the 
political balancing requirement for at least part of this success.5  
With that national reputation so firmly established, it is perhaps 
not surprising that attorneys contemplating judicial candidacy 
have not previously challenged this constitutional framework.6  
                                              
4 William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, 
Address at the Bicentennial of the Delaware Court of Chancery 
(Sep. 18, 1992) in The Prominence of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing 
Justice, 48 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1 (1992). 
5 See, e.g., Devera B. Scott, et al., The Assault on Judicial 
Independence and the Uniquely Delaware Response, 114 
PENN ST. L. REV. 217, 243 (2009) (quoting President Judge Jan 
R. Jurden as saying the “Delaware judicial nominating process 
goes to great pains to ensure a balanced and independent 
judiciary, and, therefore, it is no surprise that the public 
perceives Delaware courts as fair arbiters of justice.”); E. 
Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened 
in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-
2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005) (former Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court stating that Delaware’s judicial 
“system has served well to provide Delaware with an 
independent and depoliticized judiciary and has led . . . to 
Delaware’s international attractiveness as the incorporation 
domicile of choice.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: 
How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges 
We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683 (2005) 
(Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court noting that its 
judicial selection process has resulted “in a centrist group of 
jurists committed to the sound and faithful application of the 
law.”). 
6 Indeed, one of this court’s two courtrooms is named for 
Collins J. Seitz; a legendary judge of national prominence who 
served with great distinction as a judge on the Delaware Court 
of Chancery before being appointed to this court by President 
Johnson in 1966.   
     While sitting on the Delaware Court of Chancery, Judge 
Seitz decided Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (1952) in which 
he courageously ordered the desegregation of the Delaware 
public schools two years before the United States Supreme 
Court struck down the doctrine of “separate but equal” in 
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But that excellence cannot justify the constitutional 
transgression that is baked into the selection process. As we 
explain,7 despite the state’s interest in achieving a judicial 
system that is as fair in fact as it is in appearance, the provisions 
of the Delaware Constitution restricting who can apply for 
judicial appointment are not narrowly tailored to achieve their 
laudatory objectives. Accordingly, we need not decide whether 
Delaware has a “vital state interest” that justifies the limitations 
on political affiliation. That question may be decided in a 
future case.  Moreover, Delaware may choose to amend its 
Constitution in a manner that achieves the goals of the 
problematic political affiliation requirements without their 
attendant constitutional infirmities. 
 
No matter what ensues, I have little doubt that the 
constitutional provisions which we today invalidate have 
resulted in a political and legal culture that will ensure the 
                                              
Brown v. Bd. Of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The appeal from 
his decision there was one of the four consolidated cases before 
the Court in Brown where the Supreme Court affirmed the 
view Judge Seitz had expressed in ordering the desegregation 
of the Delaware’s schools rather than ordering Delaware to 
make its “Negro” schools equal to those serving White 
students.  In Belton, Judge Seitz based his ruling on his factual 
conclusion that the Negro schools were inferior to White 
schools and therefore not equal; the approach that was then 
required under Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
     Nevertheless, in reaching his decision, Judge Seitz clearly 
stated that the doctrine of Plessy was itself an anathema to the 
United States Constitution because segregated schools were, 
by definition, unequal. Foreshadowing Brown, he wrote: “I 
believe that the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine in education 
should be rejected, but I also believe its rejection must come 
from [the Supreme Court.].” Belton, 87 A.2d at 865.  His 
decision was later aptly described as a demonstration of Judge 
Seitz’s “courage and moral clarity.”  William T. Allen, The 
Honorable Collins J. Seitz: Greatness in a Corporate Law 
Judge, 16 FALL DEL. LAW 5, 3. (1998).   
    It is particularly appropriate to mention Judge Collins Seitz 
here because he is such a dramatic example of the judicial 
excellence I am referring to in extolling Delaware’s judiciary.  
7 Maj. Op, at 24–25. 
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continuation of the bipartisan excellence of Delaware’s 
judiciary. That culture appears to be so firmly woven into the 
fabric of Delaware’s legal tradition that it will almost certainly 
endure in the absence of the political affiliation requirements 
that run afoul of the First Amendment.   
 
